Background
From the Euro-Arab Dialogue to the Barcelona Process

Before 1995, the European Union (EU) developed a Euro-Arab dialogue with all the North African, Middle East and Gulf region countries.

After 1995, following the hopes of a peace process in the Middle East, the EU changed its strategy and adopted/enforced the Barcelona process, affecting everyone living in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region, including Israel.

This process has been influencing not only the economic Europe but also the political Europe (particularly human rights and democracy).

As the peace process in Palestine did not really evolve since 1995, the meetings of the Barcelona process have faced a large number of political obstacles. Moreover, the Arab leaders of North Africa refused to attend the Barcelona Summit of 2005.

Arab countries of North Africa (except Libya) joined the Barcelona process in its three aspects, but with the idea that it was an initiative of the EU that allowed for the acquisition of fundings. None of the expected or announced reforms were undertaken. 

Insufficient results

The revival of the process in the field of cultural exchange (Anna Lindh Foundation) was not successful for the same reason: no commitment, no ownerships, no money and no possibility to hold meetings that would escape from the influence of military and terrorist events in Palestine.

The revival of the Mediterranean idea by President Sarkozy during his presidential campaign (only including the Mediterranean countries) didn’t correspond to the initial geographical configuration of the Barcelona process (the entire European Union, plus the other countries surrounding the Mediterranean).

This idea drew a lot of media attention during the French presidency of the EU and the Euro-Mediterranean Summit, made possible by President Sarkozy.

As a result of the lack of money, commitment and ownership (despite the offer made to President Mubarak to chair a co-presidency and the promise of a balanced secretariat), and also because of the absence of peace in Palestine, the content has not changed.

Following these developments, several countries such as France, Spain, Italy and North African countries (Tunisia, Morocco, etc.) found it more efficient to improve bilateral relationships and the Euro-Mediterranean association agreements through “action plans” resulting from these bilateral conventions, taking place only in the framework of the Mediterranean process as the more developed North African countries didn’t want to be held back by the others.

Besides, some EU countries and some North African countries launched a 5 + 5 group meeting in order to avoid the negative effects of the Barcelona process (27 + 8).

Meanwhile, after the enlargement to the East and South (Cyprus and Malta) in 2004, the EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy, especially for eastern and northern neighbours that could not hope to be part of a new enlargement. During this process, the southern countries feared an unequal distribution of the European funds between the East and the South (in favour of Eastern Europe).

These views were expressed by authoritarian governments ruling these countries. Meanwhile, the aspects concerning human rights and democratisation did not make any progress.

The EU had introduced the civil society organisations in the Barcelona process while they remained divided into several sectors and places, muzzled and controlled by governments in the South.

A Forum for the civil society, organised and funded by the EU, reflected the diversity of these associations and their will to be recognised or funded rather than expressing the will of global democratic participation like it was planned in Barcelona.

The EMI decided in 2003 to address the subject enlargement and to give priority to the southern neighbours of the EU and chose to establish relations with civil society in order to draw a vision of the future as well as global, political, economic and cultural objectives.

Concerning the dialogue looking for a common and long-term vision of the future, it also chose not to do it in the pan-Mediterranean structure of the Barcelona process or the Union for the Mediterranean, avoiding the constant interference of Middle East conflicts, which the EMI foresees to address in another framework.

In establishing these relations with South Mediterranean countries (from Egypt to Maghreb), the EMI, an organisation open to all European political trends, from both majorities and oppositions, seeks not to privilege the organisations composed exclusively by political opponents (that had difficulties surviving or were forced to exile) or the GONGOs (governmental organised nongovernmental organisations), widely dependant of national authorities.
 
It organised its first Mediterranean Congress in Algiers, in partnership with the Arab Association of Women Entrepreneurs, different national committees and the Library of Alexandria, an institutional partner that enjoys a certain intellectual autonomy.

The EMI organised a second Congress, in Alicante (Spain), along with EM Spain, its local branch in Valencia and the Mediterranean House of Alicante. This meeting focused on education and migration issues.

A third Congress is in preparation with the topic of the “relationship between the civil society and the authorities”. It should allow to gently address the necessary progress of participatory democracy. This subject was discussed in Ljubljana, Nouakchott, Istanbul and will be discussed again in Yerevan at the end of 2011.

The revolutionary events in Tunisia and Egypt allow us to change the careful prospects of contacts and partnerships into quicker prospects of contacts and partnerships.

But this has to be done in the respect of the liberty of each civil society to plan for their future and to consult the government, the neighbouring countries and the international civil society, within which the EMI is an efficient leader.

Directions and Priorities
The directions to be defined by the EMI are twofold and are related to:

• Changes (acceleration and strengthening) of its dialogue with the South

• Recommendations to the EU regarding the way it defines its objectives towards the North African countries and the efficient achievement of such objectives

1. Strengthening the dialogue between the EMI and the South
Proposal to the EMI Board:

• To continue on the path followed carefully in the last 7 years, while speeding up the pace and extending the participation and the outreach in all countries, from Egypt to Maghreb, as well as adapting to the local political realities, which remain different

• To carry on with the preparation of the South-North Mediterranean Dialogue Congress in Tunisia in 2012, set at the Federal Assembly of Toledo in 2010, which topic will address the relations between the civil society and the authorities, an extremely present issue in that region

• To build a more efficient structure for the future with new elites and new organisations emerging from the gradual democratisation of theses societies

• To ask all the partner organisations to strengthen their relations with their southern counterparts in this framework 

• To build a more efficient and more balanced structure than the current Dialogue between the EMI, the Library of Alexandria and the national committees

2. Recommendations to the EU

The EMI asks the European Union:

• To review its geographical policies and its postures, taking into account the relative setback faced by the Mediterranean policy in the last 16 years, despite the texts that have been signed, in order to adapt them to the new and awaited reality of democratic States in the South, which international influence and partnerships will have to be strengthened

• The EMI suggests that the EU adapts its geographical action distinguishing the South-North Dialogue from the one held with the whole Mediterranean countries

This dialogue has the advantage to rely on:

• The contribution of Turkey as a member of the Council of Europe and the European Movement (in the North) 

• Five countries that are also part of the African Union (in the South)

Moreover, those actors are currently fighting against the same converging realities such as the emergence of a numerous and educated youth that wants an open development towards the globalised world and an evolution towards democracy and freedom.
Regarding our relations with the new governments in Tunisia and Egypt, we need a strong gesture. It would be interesting to propose to both of these countries a form of privileged partnership including an enhanced cooperation in all fields and a real financial support that could be attributed rapidly.
The EU must understand that a new destiny is in progress in the months to come on the other side of the Mediterranean and that it concerns the people living these revolutions as well as the Europeans. Stability in Europe can only win from the emergence of democratic countries able to build an open economy and society, able to keep the youth, a youth which is often well trained and able to handle the development of their country.

An important and respectful dialogue of the differences between the European Union and its neighbours of the South, whose economies are more closely linked to the European economy, can and must be the model of the relations to be created with the rest of the Arab and Muslim world of Africa, Asia and the third world as a whole.
It can follow the practices of the 5+5 dialogue or other multilateral and bilateral methods.

For the EMI, this new partnership must be put on an equal footing and respect the diversity and the mindset of the countries.

The EU must make sure not to interfere with internal affairs but has to meet the partnership demands in the fields of economic and political growth.

The European Union must ensure that:

• The agreements are balanced

• A real ownership of the principles on both sides of the Mediterranean

The EMI wishes that the directions given at the Algiers and Alicante congresses of the South-North Dialogue were taken into account, especially when it comes to education and migration as well as the urgent need to facilitate the movement of people, capable of generating dialogue and partnership (cultural, educational, economic or political) between the South and the North in order to create a better basis of cultural understanding and political and economic partnerships. This objective needs an urgent revision of the visa policy for this particular group (which accounts for less than 1% of the population) and of the circular visa policy.